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THE COMMON LAW of WISCONSIN
A. C. UMBREIT, A.M., LL.B.
It is to be noted in the first place that it is purposed to dis-
cuss the common law of Wisconsin and not the common law in
Wisconsin. It is generally asserted and theoretically, no doubt,
it is the fact, that Wisconsin is one of the legatees of the com-
mon law of England. To discuss a common law which is dis-
tinctively that of Wisconsin, not that of England, is the object
of this article.
Generally speaking, it is correct to class this state as a com-
mon law state. How much of the common law of England we
inherited is very doubtful. Thus, the Ordinance of 1787 provided
-- "The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled
to the benefits * * * of judicial proceedings according to the
course of the common law." This appears to be the only provi-
sion in that Ordinance which refers at all to the common law and
it will be admitted that this is a very indefinite and uncertain
bequest.
The constitution of our state seems to have emphasized this
legacy by providing that-"Such parts of the common law as are
now in force in the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with
this constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this
state, until altered or suspended by the Legislature." (Sect. 13,
Art. XIV.)
In some states the English statutes enacted before the Declara-
tion of Independence are considered a part of the common law.
This is not true of Wisconsin, because when the state was a part
of Michigan that state passed a law abrogating all English
statutes and this abrogation of the English statutes was adopted
for the territory of Wisconsin by its organic act. It is, hence,
quite clear that all English statutes are abrogated in this state,
some decisions to the contrary notwithstanding. (66 Wis. 376,
377, note.)
To give a definition of the old English common law will not
be attempted. No successful attempt at such a definition has as
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yet been discovered. It is universally held that the common law
of England was an unwritten law and that the moment those
principles denominated as common law were enacted into definite
statutes, they ceased to be common law and became the written
law. Neither do the decisions of the courts of England contain
the common law since it has been decided that such decisions are
merely the exposition of the common law but not the common
law itself. From this it follows that what is generally known as
the common law is an intangible, elastic, elusive, comprehensive
and, sometimes, evasive system of principles, nowhere definitely
enunciated and never authoritatively compiled and catalogued.
Law is nothing more than enlightened public opinion crystal-
lized into a rule of conduct. A rule of conduct, to be of practical
value, should be definite and certain and while it is conceivable
that such rule may as well be unwritten as written, nevertheless
it is extremely doubtful whether any rule of conduct which is
not actually defined by legislative enactment is practical and
enforcible. In spite of this, it is here contended that there is an
unwritten code or rules of conduct, indigenous to this Common-
wealth, developed since its creation in 1848, quite well defined,
although not subject to an academic definition, as distinct from
the common law of England as are the habits and customs of the
people of this state distinct from the habits and customs of the
people of the British Islands. Merely a faint outline of the
common law of Wisconsin will be attempted.
It may be claimed that a distinctive common law of this state
is impossible since it seems to have become the Wisconsin idea
to make detailed legislative provisions for every kind of com-
munal conduct. Attention may be called to the many acts that
direct in detail the conduct of our people in their intercourse
with others, such as the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Ware-
house Receipts Act, Uniform Sales Act, Uniform Partnership
Act, the many police regulation acts and a large number of
public health laws. All of these acts, and many others exist,
would be of little practical value as rules of conduct were there
not a common law of Wisconsin that interprets and administers
these economic rules.
Attention has already been called to the Ordinance of 1787
and to the Constitution of the state. It is a significant fact that
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in these two great charters of our Commonwealth are found
many detailed provisions as to the ownership of land, property
rights and the rights of contract, but very little is found in them
that directly protects the social, economic and industrial rights
of the individual. When the Ordinance and the Constitution
were enacted, people were struggling for an existence and were
satisfied if a living could be made, shelter secured and protection
against the assaults of savages afforded. The questions that con-
front us now in our social, economic and industrial life are just
as important as those that confronted our fathers, -but to solve
these questions we are constrained to have recourse, to a great
extent, to the common law of our state.
What is the common law of Wisconsin? It cannot be bound
by the limitations of a definition. It is like human life, the life
of the individual. We know life exists in the case of every
person born, but what it is has defied definition. All that we
know about life is its manifestations and when life becomes ex-
tinct, these manifestations cease, but what is it that has disap-
peared, no one has as yet been able to tell us. This something in
our jurisprudence, resembling that which is called life in the indi-
vidual, is what is here meant by the common law of our state.
Perhaps it might be called the public policy of the state, or the
spirit in which our laws have been enacted and are being inter-
preted and administered. It is the spirit back of the mere letter
of the law that constitutes the jurisprudent life of our Common-
wealth. While indefinable, it surely exists. While not tangible
because not written, it nevertheless is as effective and efficient as
any written rule of conduct, constitutional or statutory. It per-
vades our whole system of jurisprudence and is sui generis.
A mere academic discussion is generally without any prac-
tical value. It is necessary to illustrate a principle to make the
principle itself understandable or intelligible. Hence to illustrate
what this common law of our state is, a few manifestations, taken
from the highest judicial tribunal of our Commonwealth, of this
all prevailing spirit of our laws will be given.
i.. Wisconsin Justice does not travel with leaden heel. A
defendant in a criminal case is not allowed to play his game with
loaded dice, cannot juggle with his constitutional rights and privi-
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leges, remain silent when he should speak, cannot secretly store
up some technical error not affecting the merits and when the
issue has gone against him claim the benefit of such error, and
when he "comes into court with his attorney, fully advised of all
his rights and furnished with every means of making his defense"
is held to waive every constitutional right or privilege for which
he does not ask, save only the right of trial by a jury of twelve
in a capital case, former decisions of the Court and decisions of
the Supreme Court of the U. S. to the contrary notwithstanding.
"Mentors (common law precedents) of my brighter days, fare-
well !"
2. A private attorney, compensated by private parties, can-
not assist the district attorney in the trial of a person charged
with the commission of a criminal offense. The Statutes make
ft the duty of the district attorney to prosecute all criminal actions
and consequently he is a quasi-judicial officer, entrusted with
broad official discretion, thus insuring justice, if the court cannot.
This public policy exists in face of the fact that at the time the
English common law was engrafted upon our judicial system, the
prosecution by private parties was the rule rather than the excep-
tion. This public policy is maintained in spite of the fact that
under the Statutes the Governor, the Sheriff, and cities may offer
rewards for the apprehension of persons charged with felonies
and these Statutes have been interpreted to include persons who
obtain possession of facts necessary to secure the arrest and con-
viction of an unknown perpetrator of crime and give them to
some person interested, although they do not themselves make
the arrest and although the offer called for "arrest and convic-
tion"; (118 Wis. 537) ; and even trial courts "on conviction of
any person in respect to bribery, forgery, counterfeiting, gam-
bling, houses of ill fame, obscene literature, game and fish, in
case the whole or any part of the sentence shall be a fine," may
award a part of such fine to the person or persons who informed
against and prosecuted any such offender to conviction. (Sec.
4632.) Offers of reward, and especially those in the form of a
part payment of the fine to informers, have frequently been con-
demned as inducements to perjury and it would seem that public
policy should "forbid that anything should be accomplished by
means of an offer of reward which cannot be accomplished by
means of a contract."
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3. While non-resident alien friends have the right to take,
hold, enjoy, and dispose of property, real and personal, and to
make contracts with residents and to invoke legal remedies to
maintain their rights, yet a non-resident alien creditor may not
seize and carry away property of his alien debtor within the
jurisdiction of Wisconsin courts when a resident creditor also
stands at the bar of the same court with a judgment and provi-
sional lien and thus force such resident creditor to go to a foreign
court to collect his debt; and it makes no difference that the
home creditor's claim may have accrued after that of the alien-
the question is not to be determined by priority in point of time,
but by the situation at the time the court is called upon finally
to decide which creditor shall receive its aid. By the rules of
comity, the courts of Wisconsin will enforce the laws of a friendly
state or nation, provided such enforcement will not violate the
public policy or laws of the state or injuriously affect the inter-
ests of its own citizens.
4. The right to take property by inheritance or by will is a
natural right, which cannot be wholly taken away or substantially
impaired by the legislature. This natural right is protected by
the first section of our Bill of Rights and in the words "pursuit
of happiness."
5. The right to make a will is more sacred than the right
to make a contract; the latter, as evidenced by the writing, may
be judicially reformed or set aside upon equitable grounds, the
former cannot and there is no judicial power even to correct a
will. There is further the inherent right to have a will, validly
executed, carried out according to the intent of the testator and
hence all the beneficiaries or persons beneficially interested can-
not by any agreement among themselves, even with the approval
of the court, in any wise vary the terms of a will from that
intended by the testator.
6. If a board of supervisors does not furnish suitable and
convenient quarters for a circuit court and threatens to compel
the removal of the court to unsuitable and inconvenient quarters,
the judge of such court may issue an ex parte injunctional order,
without formally instituting an action, restraining such removal
by the board, under the inherent power of a constitutional court
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of general jurisdiction to protect itself against any action that
would unreasonably curtail its powers or materially impair its
efficiency.
7. The common law of Wisconsin has clearly, tersely and
concisely defined proximate cause "as the efficient cause, that
which acts first and produces the injury as a natural or probable
result, under such circumstances that he who is responsible for
such cause, as a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence,
ought reasonably to forsee that a personal injury to another may
probably follow from such person's conduct. It is not necessarily
the immediate, near or nearest cause, but the one that acts first,
whether immediate to the injury or such injury be reached by
setting other causes in motion, each in order being started nat-
urally by the one that precedes it, and altogether constituting a
complete chain or succession of events so united to each other by
a close causal connection as to form a natural whole, reaching
from the first or producing cause to the final result."
8. The average high school graduate may need the efficacy
of a non-sectarian prayer at commencement and liberty of con-
science is not invaded by holding the graduating exercises in a
church, especially when such edifice is the most available and
convenient auditorium for such occasion. "It is what is done,
not the name of the place where it is done, that is significant."
THE COMMON LAW OF WISCONSIN IS SUBJECT TO
CHANGE AND MODIFICATION.
9. Since May 3, 1913, "the right to hold and enjoy a pub-
lic office is of pecuniary value and in a broad sense is a prop-
erty right," protected by Art. V of the Amendments to U. S.
Federal Constitution (uniformly and universally held to consti-
tute limitation upon Federal powers and not to affect State
powers) and Section i, Art. XIV of same Amendments (orig-
inally adopted to extend the privileges of citizenship to the negro
race and to protect that race in the enjoyment of these privileges,
now extended so as to protect the emoluments and pecuniary
value of a public office) ; that in exercising the power of removal
for cause, the Governor as an inferior quasi-judicial tribunal
whose acts are reviewable under the supervisory control power
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of the courts and even where there is no action at law pending
to try title to the office, injunction will lie in favor of the good-
faith possessor of the office and in such injunction suit the inci-
dental question as to whether such good faith possessor is entitled
to the office at all or may not be litigated to a finality. It is true
that previous to the date above mentioned it had been uniformly
held that the title to a public office could not be tried in an equity
action, that an office is not property, nor the right to hold office
a vested right, but merely an opportunity to serve the state, but
these precedents were all crucified within two years after their
last publication.
THE COMMON LAW OF WISCONSIN HAS ITS HU-
MOROUS AS WELL AS ITS SERIOUS SIDE.
io. Judicial hindsight is better than legislative prevision.
A legislature may mis-write its state of mind and the box of Mrs.
Pandora Epimotheus may contain the difficulties the court dis-
covers in sustaining a statute where the legislature so mis-wrote
its state of mind. These difficulties may be so insurmountable
that a court may forbid the attempt of parties to exercise the
rights and privileges supposedly granted by such mis-written
statutes, although such parties are not litigants before the court.
i i. It is the common law of Wisconsin, and has been for
over 32 years, that it is the inherent power of a court of last
resort to appoint the janitor charged with the care of its rooms
and that the power to remove such janitor is possessed by the
court and an order of the superintendent of public property pur-
porting to remove the janitor previously appointed by the court
is coram non judice, and should such janitor so non-judicially
removed be omitted from the pay roll so that his monthly stipend
was not paid as "heretofore," or should the legislature neglect
to make the requisite appropriations for the pay of such janitor,
"the latter will have his remedy by action against the state in the
manner prescribed by law." The reason for such inherent power,
among other things, "is the relation of trust and confidence exist-
ing between the members of the court and the person engaged in
the position of a janitor." A "garrulous, leaky or corrupt"
janitor would be an abomination.
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12. In Wisconsin a dog is no longer allowed "his first bite"
and his owner must respond in damages for such first, inter-
mediate or final, bite whether he knows that his dog was vicious
or mischievous or not and whether such dog was so afflicted
or not.
13. A "plebeian, having aspirations beyond his humble sta-
tion in life," may be guilty of a "somewhat morganatic mesal-
liance," by violating the provisions of Section 1482, even though
"Martha Pietertje Pauline" consent, and if concrete results fol-
low, the owner of Martha, etc., "having a pedigree as long and
at least as well authenticated as that of the ordinary scion of
effete European nobility who breaks into this land of democracy
and equality and offers his title to the highest bidder at the
matrimonial bargain counter," may recover damages from the
owner of him who was responsible for "the sinister birth" of the
hybrid which was thus disqualified from "becoming a candidate
for pink ribbons at county fairs."
Numerous other examples of the common law of Wisconsin
might be given but let these suffice. It is to be distinctly under-
stood, however, that in giving the above illustrations the writer
disclaims any intention to express personal commendation or
criticism. Lex sic scripta est.
Speaking by and large and in the words of our own Supreme
Court it is the spirit of our jurisprudence, the common law- of the
state, to disregard mere form and to look at the merits of every
controversy, to face new situations and solve them in the spirit of
justice and equity, disregarding, if necessary, precedents, "look-
ing to the evils intended to be remedied, the object intended to
be attained, the effects and consequences, the reason and spirit."
(143 Wis. 477).
